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Defining a role for states within a federal cap-and-trade 
program will require balancing the benefits of preserv-
ing states’ ability to innovate and spur emissions reduc-
tions with the challenges that state-by-state regulation 
may create for some businesses. Finding the approach 
that draws on the unique strengths of each level of 
government will help ensure a more effective nation-
wide cap-and-trade program and a more cost-effective 
means for reducing emissions. However, it requires 
expressly providing a mechanism for state action in 
the federal law.
This policy brief presents the competing arguments 
for state-led and federal-led climate legislation, and 
argues for a third—“hybrid”—approach that maximizes 
the strengths of each level of government. The authors 
argue that preserving space for state climate change 
action in a future federal cap-and-trade program will 
be necessary to achieve desired emissions reductions, 
and outline possible roles for states under a federal 
cap-and-trade program. Approaches such as these will 
allow for continued state innovation while also achieving 
substantial nationwide uniformity. Without such provi-
sions, the federal government may unwittingly reduce or 
eliminate the incentive states have to implement strong 
policies that complement federal efforts.
exeCutive Summary
introduction
As the U.S. Congress debates policies to address climate 
change and considers enacting a national cap-and-trade 
program, lawmakers will have to consider the role that states 
should play in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the 
extent to which they should be encouraged to go beyond the 
reductions required by federal policy. Answering these ques-
tions will require balancing the benefits of preserving states’ 
ability to innovate and spur reductions with the challenges 
that state-by-state regulation may create for some businesses. 
Finding the approach that draws on the unique strengths of 
each level of government will help ensure a more effective 
nationwide cap-and-trade program and a more cost-effective 
means for reducing emissions.
This policy brief presents options for balancing federal and 
state action within a future federal cap-and-trade program. It 
does not address specific mitigation policies states might use 
to achieve reductions. The brief will:
•	 Review	arguments	for	action	at	the	state	and	federal	levels;
•	 Examine	the	law	of	federal	preemption;	
•	 Discuss	the	difficulties	a	federal	cap-and-trade	program	
could present for states seeking more aggressive reduc-
tions	than	those	achieved	in	a	federal	program;	and
•	 Provide	specific	options	to	enable	state	climate	action	
while preserving the primary benefits of federal action. 
The objective is to create a more effective and efficient system 
for reducing emissions by allowing each level of government 
to do what it does best.
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understandinG the BeneFits oF Federal and 
state action
To maximize the strengths of both federal and state govern-
ments in a federal cap-and-trade program, it is important to 
understand the chief benefits of acting at each level.1 With 
this understanding, policy makers can achieve consistency and 
broad coverage through federal action while also preserving 
state authority to contribute to solutions. 
The arguments around whether particular policy matters 
should be handled by the state or federal governments are as 
old as the United States itself. These arguments have been 
applied to environmental regulations since the 1960s, when 
state-level regulations proliferated and calls for federal envi-
ronmental policy action grew louder. This same dynamic is 
generating pressure on the federal government to enact federal 
climate policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The debate about who should have primary responsibility 
for environmental protection has at least three sides. There 
are those who argue that states are in the best position to 
govern matters that affect the safety and welfare of their 
citizens. Others maintain that all matters affecting interstate 
commerce should be handled at the federal level. A more re-
cently emerging school of thought suggests that both of these 
perspectives have it wrong: environmental protection is best 
handled through a sharing of responsibilities between federal 
and state governments to maximize the benefits of acting at 
each level.2 The competing perspectives are outlined below 
with specific focus on how each may be applied to a federal 
cap-and-trade program.
Benefits of State action
States are well positioned to enact climate policies: they have 
the local expertise in the areas where emissions reductions are 
needed;	they	are	historically	policy	innovators;	and	they	serve	
as important first movers to spur federal action both before 
and after the federal government has acted.
State governments have considerable experience regulating 
sectors where climate change action is needed. These areas 
include electricity resource planning, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy policy, and land-use and transportation 
planning. States are also in the best position to address chal-
lenges and capture benefits unique to the state or geographical 
region. With respect to a cap-and-trade program, proponents 
might argue that because state governments are “closer to the 
ground,” they are in the best position to determine the most 
appropriate use of proceeds from an allowance auction, or to 
decide how allowances should be allocated. 
States function as “laboratories of democracy” that innovate to 
design new policies, allowing other states and the federal gov-
ernment	to	follow	or	learn	from	these	experiences.	Providing	
incentives in a federal cap-and-trade program for state-by-state 
experimentation in policy design or implementation would 
preserve and promote this innovation. 
In areas like climate change where federal action is highly 
desirable, state action can push the federal government to 
tackle new problems when political will or economic interests 
nationwide do not create the right context for action. This 
dynamic is already playing out as state and regional climate 
change	action	has	preceded	federal	policies.	Even	after	the	
federal government has acted to address a problem, states can 
still point the way for additional federal efforts by demonstrat-
ing that further reductions can be achieved cost effectively. 
In the cap-and-trade context, this ability to lead could be pre-
served if states are allowed enough space within the federal 
cap-and-trade program to devise and demonstrate effective 
emission reduction policies that the federal government might 
later incorporate. 
Benefits of Federal action
There are many arguments for implementing environmental 
policies at the federal level. Federal action provides a mini-
mum level of uniformity for business, achieves broader results 
because it applies across all 50 states, and demonstrates U.S. 
leadership in international negotiations.
A policy implemented at the federal level can provide unifor-
mity for those who conduct business across state lines. In the 
cap-and-trade context, multiple programs across the states and 
regions create a “patchwork” of policies leading to competitive 
disadvantages for some and advantages for others, and varied 
obligations for companies operating in multiple jurisdictions. 
A federal program allows for development of one centralized 
system, simplifying compliance for regulated entities across 
state boundaries.
Unlike the actions of one or a group of states, action by the 
federal government ensures that the policy covers the entire 
country.	Relying	solely	on	states	to	tackle	a	problem	inevitably	
leaves gaps in coverage, and may result in “leakage” of emis-
sions from regulated states to unregulated ones. Because tack-
ling a particular environmental problem may be unpopular in a 
specific state or region of the country, the problem may never 
be addressed in some (potentially high-emitting) areas. 
The current array of state and regional greenhouse gas cap-and-
trade programs illustrate this problem. While many states have 
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acted, many have not, or have taken smaller steps to reduce 
emissions. The group of Northeast states that have designed 
and	 implemented	 the	Regional	Greenhouse	Gas	 Initiative	
have opted to cover only power plants, while the regional ef-
forts in the West and the Midwest will be broader.3 A federal 
cap-and-trade program could achieve more complete coverage 
across all states. 
Cap and trade is perhaps best implemented at the federal level, 
because the larger the geographical and regulatory scope of 
a cap-and-trade program, the greater the potential that the 
emissions market will achieve cheaper reductions. This is 
especially important in the greenhouse gas context, because 
the overwhelming body of science demands deep reductions 
by mid-century. Success will depend on finding the policy mix 
that achieves the needed emissions reductions at the lowest 
possible cost.
Lastly, because greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmo-
sphere are the result of emissions globally, the best U.S. policy 
is one that contributes to an international solution. Appropriate 
federal action will demonstrate leadership by the United States 
and help put U.S. negotiators in a position to achieve a fair 
and effective international agreement. A federal cap-and-trade 
program would also create an emissions “currency” that could 
be connected to a global emissions reduction market. 
Benefits of Joint action
Given	the	substantial	benefits	that	come	from	state	and	federal	
action, it is appropriate to seek to maximize the benefits of 
both through a federal cap-and-trade program that preserves 
an effective role for states. Indeed, although the federalism 
question is most often presented as a clear choice between state 
or federal action, over the past half century most federal envi-
ronmental policies have applied minimum uniform regulations 
across the country while simultaneously reserving substantial 
state authority to enact more stringent policies. Many federal 
programs have also granted states substantial leeway in choosing 
specific policy instruments to meet state-specific needs.4 
This history demonstrates several benefits of a shared federal 
and state approach:
1. National Scope. A nationwide policy ensures some mini-
mum level of action in all 50 states, and thereby ensures 
larger emissions reductions and a more robust program 
than state-by-state actions provide. 
2. Substantial but not Complete Uniformity. A shared ap-
proach allows for substantial uniformity nationwide 
while preserving flexibility for states to tailor policies to 
state-specific	needs	or	goals.	Given	the	federal	nature	
of government in the United States, substantial but not 
complete uniformity is perhaps the best possible result.
3. Preservation of States’ Ability to Innovate and Push Policy. 
A federal policy that allows states to enact more stringent 
policies will preserve the state “laboratories of democ-
racy,” as well as the states’ role as policy driver.
4. Flexibility. A shared approach that allows states signifi-
cant flexibility in meeting minimum federal requirements 
should yield policies better adapted to specific state cir-
cumstances and interests. This flexibility allows states to 
use low-cost tools not available to the federal government 
to reduce emissions and energy demand and thereby 
lower the cost of achieving the federal cap. 
In attempting to preserve key roles for states in an economy-
wide cap-and-trade program while providing businesses with 
needed consistency, it is important to understand generally 
the law of federal preemption, as well as the specific technical 
challenges posed by a federal cap. These topics are addressed 
below, followed by a discussion of options in the context of a 
future federal cap-and-trade program. 
the law oF Federal PreemPtion: 
imPlications For climate leGislation
Federal preemption occurs when a federal law conflicts with 
a state law. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Con-
stitution provides that federal law will govern in the case of 
such a conflict.5
Preemption	of	state	law	can	occur	in	three	distinct	circum-
stances. First, through what is termed “express preemption,” 
a federal law preempts a state law when the federal statute 
explicitly states that states may not regulate in a particular 
area. When faced with an express preemption question, courts 
generally determine whether the challenged state law or 
regulation is of the type that Congress intended to preempt. 
This is a relatively straightforward question when the statutory 
language is clearly drafted.
Second, through what is referred to as “implied preemption,” 
a state law may be deemed preempted if it directly conflicts 
with	or	frustrates	the	federal	law.	Preemption	by	conflict	occurs	
even though the federal statute contains no express language 
on preemption. In such a case, the Supremacy Clause renders 
the federal law supreme. 
Third, implied preemption may also occur if a court determines 
that Congress has so pervasively regulated a field that there is 
no room left for state action. This is referred to as “occupying 
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the field,” and again arises without express statutory language 
on preemption.
Because implied preemption by conflict or by “occupying the 
field” occurs in the absence of specific statutory preemption 
language, it is important for federal policymakers to consider 
the potential that a proposed federal statute will directly con-
flict with existing or proposed state actions. If preemption is not 
intended, an express reservation of states’ right in the federal 
statute preserves their ability to continue acting even after 
the federal measure is implemented. An important example 
of this kind of express reservation of state authority is found 
in the Clean Air Act.
Table 1 displays a range of potential preemption situations as 
they relate to a state’s authority to carry out more stringent 
greenhouse gas reduction programs after federal legislation 
establishing a federal cap-and-trade program. 
understandinG the eFFect oF a Federal 
caP-and-trade ProGram on state Policies
In addition to the potential for preemption of state policies that 
directly conflict with a federal cap-and-trade program, it is im-
portant to understand how a federal emissions cap can render 
moot certain types of state emissions reductions regardless of 
whether the architects of the federal program intend to nullify 
those actions. This occurs because the federal cap acts not only 
as an upper limit on emissions from the covered sources, but 
also as a floor. Consider this example (Figure 1).
Power	Plant	A	in	State	X	and	Power	Plant	B	in	State	Y	are	
regulated under a federal cap-and-trade program, meaning 
they must surrender one federal allowance for every ton of 
carbon dioxide they emit. The federal program distributes 
a number of emissions allowances equal to the total number 
of	tons	permitted	from	all	covered	sources.	State	X	decides	
to implement a state-level policy to further reduce emissions 
from	Power	Plant	A.	What	is	the	effect	of	this	policy?	Emis-
sions	from	Power	Plant	A	are	reduced,	but	the	total	number	
of federal allowances available to power plants nationwide has 
not	changed.	This	means	that	the	federal	allowances	Power	
Plant	A	no	longer	needs	can	be	used	by	Power	Plant	B	in	state	
Y	to	increase	its	emissions.	The	net	effect	is	that	state	X’s	more	
stringent policy enables an equivalent increase in emissions at 
sources	outside	State	X,	thus	nullifying	the	additional	reduction. 
This dynamic can dampen the effects of a wide range of state 
policies designed to produce greater reductions of emissions 
covered by a federal cap. Consider, for example, the effect on 
overall emissions of a state program aimed at getting house-
holds to reduce electricity consumption by purchasing more 
efficient appliances, if the electricity sector is covered by a 
federal emissions cap-and-trade program.6 The state program 
may successfully reduce electricity demand and emissions from 
local energy sources, but the national cap on emissions does 
not change. The total pollution level remains the same. This 
 taBle 1 levels of Preemption and impact on States’ ability to regulate
 More Federal Control                More State Flexibility
States expressly 
and broadly 
preempted 
from any pro-
gram to reduce 
greenhouse gas 
emissions.
States expressly 
preempted from 
imposing require-
ments to reduce 
direct emissions 
from sources 
covered by the fed-
eral cap-and-trade 
program.
Federal bill silent on pre-
emption and no evidence 
of intent to “occupy the 
field. States reserve all 
authority that does not 
conflict with federal pro-
gram, potentially including 
reductions from sources 
under the federal cap.
States expressly 
permitted to 
impose more 
stringent state 
requirements, but 
no authority to 
restrict or retire 
federal cap-and-
trade allowances.
States expressly 
permitted to impose 
more stringent state 
requirements, and 
expressly permitted 
to unilaterally retire 
federal allowances to 
account for deeper 
state reductions.
Taken from Litz, F. (2008). Toward a Constructive Dialogue on State and Federal Roles in Climate Policy (Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change) at http://www.pewclimate.org/statefedroles.
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same dynamic applies in the case of any state program that 
has the effect of reducing emissions locally on covered sources 
only to free up federal allowances that can be used elsewhere 
in the country or in another sector. 
It is important to note that although additional greenhouse gas 
reductions may not be realized by such state policies, these 
actions may reduce the overall cost of the cap-and-trade pro-
gram by reducing demand for fossil fuels and taking pressure 
off allowance prices. Indeed, any allowances freed up by more 
stringent reduction policies in one state will increase the supply 
of federal allowances, which will tend to lower their price. It is 
possible that a lower allowance price could lead to a decision 
to tighten the federal cap, causing deeper overall reductions, 
but this would require a revision to the federal policy.
Unless federal law states otherwise, states also cannot actively 
interfere with the federal allowances issued by the federal gov-
ernment in a cap-and-trade program. At least one state—New 
York—has	tried	unsuccessfully	to	impose	state	requirements	
on use of allowances by in-state sources under the federal 
acid	rain	trading	program.	New	York	enacted	the	“Air	Pollu-
tion Mitigation Law,” which prohibited electric generating 
facilities	 in	New	York	from	selling	any	excess	allowances	to	
sources located in 14 up-wind states. On a challenge to the 
law, the federal courts determined that the state statute was 
preempted by the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act, 
because it directly conflicted or frustrated the federal program 
by restricting the sale of federal allowances.7
The	New	York	experience	provides	an	important	lesson:	pre-
serving the states’ ability to enact more stringent policies in the 
context of a federal cap-and-trade program requires expressly 
providing a mechanism for state action in the federal law. Some 
examples of this approach are discussed in the next section. 
oPtions For an eFFective state role 
Given	the	law	of	preemption	and	the	practical	impact	that	a	
federal cap can have on state climate action, it is clear that 
federal climate legislation will determine states’ role in the 
federal program and their freedom to pursue additional reduc-
tion activities and policies. Legislative design, including defini-
tions of included sectors and rules governing the allocation of 
allowances and revenues, will foreclose options or open doors 
to additional state-driven reductions. 
Preserving	space	for	state	climate	action	in	a	future	federal	
cap-and-trade program is desirable and will be necessary to 
achieve desired emissions reductions and transform the U.S. 
economy. The options below offer possible roles for states 
under a federal cap-and-trade program.
Option 1: allow States to Control allowance Budgets 
One way to ensure that states can tighten the emissions policies 
on in-state sources covered by a federal cap-and-trade program 
is to allow states to control the number of federal allowances 
issued to sources within its territory. This could include pro-
viding states with allowances to enact complementary state 
policies to reduce emissions. If allowances are allocated from 
the federal budget, the state can determine the best local use 
of those allowances. 
Under this approach, the federal agency would issue states 
specific allowance budgets. The states would be free to retire 
allowances rather than issue them to the market or to auction 
them to raise money to implement complementary emissions 
reduction policies. A variation on this approach would be to al-
low states to control only a portion of the allowance budget.8 
California’s	Global	Warming	 Solutions	Act	 of	 2006,	 a.k.a.	
“AB32,” provides an example of how this approach might work. 
AB32 requires an economy-wide reduction of greenhouse gas 
pollution to 1990 levels by 2020 within the State of California. 
Unless California is given at least some control over the federal 
emissions allowance budget, any federal program that is less 
stringent than California’s program will tend to dilute the re-
ductions achieved in California. Any federal allowances distrib-
uted to cover California sources will be freed up and sold to be 
used outside the state. However, if the federal program allowed 
California to retire allowances from its federal allowance bud-
get equal to the additional reductions achieved under AB32 be-
yond those achieved under California’s share of the federal cap, 
then the effect of California’s reductions would be restored. 
Similarly, if a state implements aggressive end-use energy 
efficiency, it can ensure that reductions achieved under this 
complementary policy are safeguarded if it is permitted to 
retire enough federal allowances to match the reductions 
achieved under the energy efficiency policy. This approach 
could be used to preserve reductions achieved under a wide 
variety of state programs, from transit-oriented development 
to vehicle tailpipe standards.9
This approach has its disadvantages, including the uncertainty 
introduced into program costs when fifty different states can 
affect the level of the federal cap by withholding allowances. 
However, these potential disadvantages could be mitigated by 
limiting the total portion of the allowances in the control of 
states, or by placing federal parameters around acceptable al-
location methodologies at the state level. The aggregate effect 
of these allowance retirements may be small compared to the 
total	number	of	allowances	in	the	system.	For	example,	WRI’s	
analysis of the Climate Security Act (S.2191) introduced by 
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Senators Lieberman and Warner shows that for states to achieve 
the level of greenhouse gas reductions that they have already 
mandated through enacted statutes, approximately 4.2 billion 
metric tons—or 2.8 percent of the total cumulative allowance 
pool between 2012 and 2050—would need to be retired.10 
Option 2: allow States to impose restrictions on  
allowances
An alternative to allowing states control over the allowance 
budgets and allocation methods is to allow states to place 
restrictions on the sale or use of allowances after they are al-
located by the federal authority. Under this approach, states 
could require in-state facilities to retire allowances in excess 
of their emissions, or require facilities that shut down to retire 
their allowances.
The advantage of this approach is that states could impose 
requirements that best suit the states’ policies. States could 
prevent sources with reduced emissions due to complementary 
state programs (such as energy efficiency or renewable energy 
programs) from canceling those reductions by selling freed-up 
allowances. Allowing states to impose restrictions on allowance 
sales, however, risks creating different “currencies,” whereas 
simply retiring allowances would not.
An alternative to vesting states with the ability to reduce state 
allowance budgets or impose restrictions on the sale or use of 
allowances would be for the federal government to provide for 
an adjustment of the national cap. This could occur on petition 
by a state that seeks to tighten the emissions restrictions on 
in-state sources, or on the federal government’s own motion. 
This approach poses a challenge for states by placing control 
exclusively in the hands of the federal government, which 
will always have the ability to revisit the national cap whether 
the law provides for such revision or not. States looking to go 
beyond federal efforts are in a weaker position when they have 
to petition the federal government rather than being able to 
tighten the cap on their own initiative, and this approach may 
deter states’ innovation.
Option 3: distribute allowances or auction revenue 
to States for Complementary Policies
In addition to providing for adjustment to the federal emis-
sions cap to reflect additional state reductions, the federal 
program could provide revenue from an allowance auction 
to states for implementation of complementary policies, such 
as low- and middle-income energy assistance, incentives 
for energy-efficient appliances and vehicles as well as mass 
transit. These may be environmental priorities for states, 
and support the economic transition to a low-carbon state 
economy. 
This approach has the advantage of supporting state policy in 
areas where they have particular expertise or relevant jurisdic-
tion. In some cases, policies that fall under state and local au-
thority may drive reductions more effectively than those at the 
federal level. For example, analyses of the transportation sector 
indicate that drivers are not very sensitive to small changes 
in the price of fuel, and that few emissions reductions would 
be made in this sector if it were included in a cap-and-trade 
program with moderate targets.11 However, state and local 
entities have additional opportunities to reduce transportation 
emissions that are not available to the federal government. 
These opportunities include land-use planning and developing 
communities that require fewer miles to be driven. 
Similarly, some policies are best tailored to local or regional 
conditions. For example, building codes—another way of get-
ting at low-cost residential and commercial energy efficiency—
are implemented at the state and local levels, where local 
temperatures and weather considerations can be taken into 
account. Likewise, policies to promote renewable energy can 
take advantage of high regional resource potential such as the 
availability of wind or tidal power. 
A set amount of auction revenue (or allowances) might be given 
to states simply for having enacted a policy of a certain type 
(e.g., electricity revenue decoupling). Alternatively, incentives 
could be tied to the level of reductions actually achieved by 
the complementary policies, with allowances or funds given 
on a per-ton basis. This approach would be more challenging 
to implement because it would require periodic “audits” by 
the federal government of state programs, and it is often dif-
ficult to ascertain the precise cause of a specific reduction. 
Such incentives would not only reward early-acting states, but 
could also bring on additional states that might not otherwise 
have acted, and provide the funds needed to implement such 
programs. 
By continuing to implement innovative emissions-reduction 
programs, state policy makers can experiment with creative 
solutions that might be too uncertain or politically unpalatable 
to try at a federal scale in the short term. States have the ability 
to test these options, and to encourage other states or the fed-
eral government to adopt the ones that prove most successful. 
While this option would not yield additional reductions—the 
tons reduced through investment of auction revenues would 
not reduce the federal cap—it could make the cap easier or 
less expensive to meet, particularly in the long term.
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Option 4: allow States to Opt Out of the Federal 
Program if they Join an alternative State Program
The Clean Air Act’s treatment of California vehicle standards 
provides a model for creating a single state alternative to a 
federal regulation. The Act preempts states and local govern-
ments from establishing laws to regulate emissions from new 
vehicles. However, it allows California to petition for a waiver 
to establish its own standards. Once the state receives such a 
waiver, other states are free to join the California program.12 
Thus, states are given some flexibility in determining how 
aggressively to regulate emissions in their jurisdictions, but 
regulated manufacturers are subjected to no more than two 
different standards throughout the country.
A similar system might be established for economy-wide 
greenhouse gas emissions. A state or region—such as the 
Northeast states that were the first to implement a carbon cap-
and-trade program—might petition for a waiver to establish 
its	own	GHG	program,	opting	out	of	a	federal	cap-and-trade	
system and creating an alternative that other states or regions 
could adopt. States choosing this alternative program could 
pursue more aggressive reductions, but regulated entities 
would be faced with no more than two different compliance 
regimes. For added simplicity, a state-based trading system 
could be linked with a federal one, with the same allowances 
eligible for compliance in either program, but the existence 
of separate caps would allow states interested in pursuing 
further reductions the ability to achieve them.
One potentially helpful way to think about state flexibility 
under a broad federal cap-and-trade program is along a range 
of potential outcomes, much like the range of federal preemp-
tion outcomes laid out above. Table 2 depicts one range of 
potential outcomes.
recommendations For a hyBrid aPProach 
As Congress moves toward enactment of a federal cap-and-
trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across the 
nation, lawmakers should balance the federal objectives of 
national uniformity and greater coverage with the benefits 
that accrue when states can innovate and initiate policy. This 
balancing can be accomplished with a hybrid policy framework 
that enables all levels of government to grapple meaningfully 
with the challenge of climate change.
Congress should allow states some control over the federal 
allowances allocated for state action, and allocations to the 
states should be adequate to support local development options 
including transportation planning, land use and building deci-
sions, as well as energy resource planning and efficiency. Within 
this framework, states could be granted full or partial control of 
their federal emissions allowance budgets, the ability to receive 
allowances for reductions achieved through complementary 
programs, the ability to petition the federal government to 
strengthen the program, or the right to opt out of the federal 
program and into a single more aggressive alternative. Without 
options such as these, the federal government may unwittingly 
reduce or eliminate the incentive states have to implement 
strong complementary programs, such as aggressive end-use 
energy efficiency programs, because reductions achieved 
through such programs do not change the overall federal cap. 
The goal is to create large markets that can reduce mitigation 
costs without creating fifty different emissions markets or du-
plicative compliance obligations within a state. It is important to 
reward states for early policy action and to support experimen-
tation with programs that may prove to be models of low-cost 
options. A national cap-and-trade program should encourage 
emissions reduction programs tailored to meet local needs and 
opportunities, as well as the discovery of new policy options that 
can be replicated by other states and the federal government.
 TABlE	2	 A	Range	of	Options	for	States	in	a	Federal	Cap-and-Trade	Program
 More Federal Control                More State Flexibility
States receive 
no control over 
allowances and 
no proceeds from 
federal allowance 
auction.
States receive 
proceeds from the 
federal allow-
ance auction for 
complementary 
policies;	no	ability	
to retire or restrict 
sale or use of fed-
eral allowances.
States given 
right to peti-
tion	EPA	to	
tighten federal 
cap to account 
for more 
stringent state 
programs.
States get control 
over some allow-
ances, based on 
implementation 
of complemen-
tary policies, 
including right 
to sell and retire 
allowances.
States get control over allow-
ances attributable to the state’s 
output, including right to sell 
and retire allowances, and use 
the allowances for complemen-
tary purposes.
States may opt out of a federal 
cap-and-trade program in favor 
of a single state alternative.
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notes
 1. For a more thorough treatment of this issue, see Litz, F. (2008), 
Toward a Constructive Dialogue on State and Federal Roles in 
Climate Policy, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/statefedroles.
 2. Adelman, D. and K. Engel (2007). “Adaptive Federalism: The Case 
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,” 92 
Minn. L. Rev. 1796.
 3. For more information on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
see http://www.rggi.org; for information on the Western Climate 
Initiative, see http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org; and for in-
formation on the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, 
see http://www.midwesternaccord.org.
 4. There is a long list of examples for this shared approach, including 
clean air regulation under the Clean Air Act; clean water regulation 
under the Clean Water Act; and Hazardous waste cleanup under fed-
eral and state Superfund laws. For a review of the various jurisdictional 
areas of state and federal government, see Litz 2008 supra note 1. 
 5. The Supremacy Clause reads, “This Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
 6. It is important to note here that state programs directed at sources 
not covered by the federal cap-and-trade program do not have this 
effect. Reductions from such programs can therefore be encour-
aged without the need for adjustment of the federal cap.
 7. It should be emphasized that the New York law represented one 
particularly blatant type of “interference” with the federal allow-
ances. It is not clear if less intrusive state methods would hold up 
under constitutional scrutiny. For example, it has been suggested 
that states could require federal sources to retire 1.5 allowances for 
every ton emitted, and that this approach is expressly authorized 
under the Clean Air Act’s provisions that allow states to seek deeper 
reductions than the federal government. 
 8. This approach has a precedent in two existing cap-and-trade programs 
administered by the federal Environmental Protection Agency. The 
“NOx SIP Call” cap-and-trade program covering much of the eastern 
United States left allocations to the states, as did the recently enacted 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). See http://www.epa.gov/cair/. 
 9. Quantification of emissions reductions achieved through comple-
mentary policies will be more difficult for some measures than for 
others. Retiring allowances to compensate states for these reduc-
tions will likely involve some degree of approximation.
 10. The 4.2 billion tons represent the amount of additional reductions 
the leadership states would achieve beyond the Climate and Secu-
rity Act, taking into account more stringent state statutes.
 11. Nordhaus, Robert R., Kyle W. Danish (2003). Designing a Manda-
tory Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program for the U.S., Arlington, 
VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.
 12. See Sections 202 and 209 of the Clean Air Act.
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